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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses an original dataset for 206 workplaces in Thessaly (Greece), to 
study consequences of Greece’s employment protection law (EPL) and 
national wage minimum for temporary employment. We find higher 
temporary employment rates especially among a “grey” market group of 
workplaces that pay low wages and avoid the national wage minimum. A 
similar factor boosts family employment. We also find that EPL “matters”, in 
particular, managers who prefer temporary contracts because temps are less 
protected definitely employ more temps. We discuss whether temporary and 
family work is a form of escape from regulation for less prosperous firms. 
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The impact of Greek labour market 
regulation on temporary and family  
employment - Evidence from a new survey 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The role of labour regulation in protecting insiders at the expense of 
outsiders is an important topic for economists. Greece provides an 
interesting case of de jure heavy regulation with high wage and working 
conditions floors, which at the same time might be widely avoided de 
facto by its many small firms. Does labour regulation matter in these 
circumstances? To cast light on the Greek case we bring forward an 
original survey of employment relations in the Greek province of 
Thessaly in 2006-7, the Thessaly Employment Relations Survey (TERS). 
This survey was based on the UK’s Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey (WERS), with additions to address specific issues of Greek labour 
regulation. The survey covers the full range of firm sizes including the 
smallest, so we can assess avoidance of the law. As an indicator of how 
firms react to legal constraints, we focus on temporary worker hiring 
rates, which might represent an “escape route” for the poorer firms. 
The years of the survey 2006-7 were years of comparative prosperity, 
yet the Greek labour market was performing badly even then, which 
gives urgency to the search for causes. Thus, among OECD countries 
(OECD 2007) in 2006 Greece was amongst the worst (fourth last) for the 
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percentage of long-term unemployed, and also for youth 
unemployment. As regards temporary work, Greece also had higher 
rates than average (about 12%). The coexistence of high rates of 
unemployment and temporary work in Greece is unsatisfactory, given 
that temporary work which is not a “stepping stone” to permanent work 
simply offers insecurity and less training and pay. Of course, a firm hires 
workers on a temporary basis for many reasons such as seasonal 
demand variation which have nothing to do with legal constraints. 
Nevertheless, controlling for such factors, it is possible that some 
temporary work offers are a response to high firing costs coupled with 
wage inflexibility, a sign of a distressed labour market as we now 
investigate.  
The central empirical contribution of the paper is the estimation of the 
determinants of temporary work and family work among firms in 
Thessaly. Temporary and family work is important avenues of labour 
flexibility for Greek businesses. In taking up the issue of temporary work 
in Greece, we are following in the footsteps of Voudouris (2004) who 
studied temporary and subcontracting work in 75 large mainly 
manufacturing companies and Mihail (2003) who studied 30 large 
organisations, including in the public sector. In addition, we bring in 
family work because it can have a similar precarious nature. Our focus is 
on the legal constraints that private sector businesses face, particularly 
national wage agreements and employment protection legislation (EPL), 
and we hypothesise that temporary or family work is resorted to 
(holding other factors equal) when these regulatory constraints bite. In 
other words, “poor” firms, which cannot afford the national wage rates 
or the EPL standards, attempt to escape these standards by employing 
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temps, or alternatively, family workers. This hypothesis can be seen as a 
variation of Almeida and Susanli (2011) that EPL causes firms to choose a 
smaller size. The strong point of our empirical research is that, in 
addition to small and medium firms, it includes a representative sample 
of micro-enterprises which are more likely to evade the law (Mihail 
2004). 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss 
theoretical determinants of temporary and family worker hiring. Then 
we outline the labour regulation framework in Greece. In section 4 we 
give details of the TERS survey. In sections 5 and 6 we present the 
method and results. The last section concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical considerations 
Our hypothesis is that temporary and family work is resorted to when 
regulatory constraints concerning wage and working conditions floors 
bite, holding other determinants of temporary work constant. The 
standard model for temporary work is outlined by Kahn (2007 and 
2010). In this model all entry level jobs begin with the same labour 
productivity, and after a period the firm decides either to turn the job 
into a permanent one, or to dismiss the worker and replace him/her 
with another temp. The firm’s optimal policy here is to permit only those 
workers exceeding a productivity hurdle y* to become permanent.  
The model predicts that higher permanent worker EPL firing costs raise 
the productivity hurdle y*, reducing the chance that jobs will become 
permanent – which is plausible. International evidence (Kahn 2007; 
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Booth, Dolado and Frank 2002) generally bear out this prediction. 
Admittedly, business recession also seems to increase temp employment 
(Kahn 2010), presumably because the option of easy dismissal of a temp 
worker becomes more valuable in recession. Furthermore, laws 
“protecting” temp workers, for example by restricting the circumstances 
in which temps are employed, should have an opposite effect, by 
blocking the temp worker “escape route” (though as Booth et al, 2002 
note, these laws are paradoxically related to increases in temp 
employment, perhaps because of contradictory aims). At any rate, given 
aggregate business conditions - as our focus on cross-sectional 
comparisons between firms will permit - standard theory predicts that 
stricter (regular) worker EPL makes temp employment more likely.  
A further factor which needs to be taken into account is wage flexibility 
(Lazear 1990; Addison and Teixeira 2003) which in principle would allow 
the parties to contract around strict EPL by lowering wages. Wage floors 
can prevent such wage adjustment from occurring and so promote temp 
employment given EPL. Wage floors are pushed upwards by extended 
collective agreements, strong unions, higher welfare payment 
replacement ratios, and also higher taxes (which raise replacement 
ratios). The effect should be greatest for unskilled workers whose wages 
are closest to the wage floor and so least able to flex downwards. 
Indeed, research (Bertola, Blau and Kahn, 2007) has shown that union 
wage compression is linked with less employment of unskilled workers 
at the bottom of the wage distribution. Such “marginalisation” should 
also mean that unskilled workers are pushed into temporary rather than 
permanent work. In sum, wage inflexibility and compression lead us to 
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expect temp work to be particularly an option for the marginal unskilled 
worker group, given EPL. 
Extending the argument to employment of family members, we see 
these as having a similar temporary status. Naturally there are 
differences; in particular, employment of a family member is easier since 
no particular legal requirements have to be met. Moreover, there is a 
limited supply of family members, which becomes important as firm size 
increases beyond the micro. Still, we expect temporary and family 
workers to some extent to be substitutes, and offer a parallel treatment 
of the two types. 
In the TERS context, our data refer to firms rather than individuals, so we 
need to look for marginal firms rather than marginal workers to assess 
temp and family worker responses. In empirical terms, the marginal firm 
it likely to be one that is performing badly, for example, paying low 
wages, or making redundancies. Such firms will be less able to afford to 
pay the collectively agreed wage than the prosperous firms, and hence 
are more likely to employ workers on a temporary basis, or draft-in 
family workers. Basically, our hypothesis is based on the idea that if a 
firm feels constrained by EPL, or by national wage agreements, it is more 
likely to adopt flexible forms of employment which provide an escape 
route.  
 
3.  The framework for labour regulation in Greece 
We consider floors under wages and working conditions in turn. The 
main floor under wages in Greece is provided by extended collective 
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agreements. Greece has had this type of system since the dictator 
Metaxas in the 1930s subsidised and subordinated the trade unions (see 
Kritsantonis 1998; on Greece’s “neo-corporatism” see Sotiropoulos, 
2004). The two main union federations are still funded by the state 
(Ioannou 2005). At the same time, unions are weak at the local level in 
most of the private sector (Matsagannis, 2007), and indeed unionisation 
is negligible in all the firms in the TERS sample. Despite attempts in the 
1980s and particularly with Law 1876 of 1990 to stimulate workplace 
union representation and company agreements (Kritsantonis, 1998:520), 
the centralised wage setting system has continued. Importantly, up until 
2012 a National General Collective Agreement (NGCA) set a national 
minimum wage for private sector employees (Koutsogeorgopoulou, 
1994). This agreement could be supplemented by sectoral agreements 
(Zambarloukou 2006), which were generally extended to non-union 
workers by the Greek Ministry of Labour. These agreements set the 
wage floor in which we are interested.  
Centralised wage-setting is important because the less prosperous firms 
may worry about whether they can afford permanent workers at these 
wage rates. It is possible that high wages – suitable perhaps for Athens, 
but too high for provincial labour markets – cause businesses not only to 
resort to temp employment, but also to remain small and family-based. 
It is true that these minimum wages are often not paid (see below). 
However, minimum wages, even if not paid by a firm, can make 
management worried about being found out, and so “chill” decisions by 
making for more cautious, temporary, hiring. Therefore, one aim of the 
TERS is to ascertain whether the firm is close to the national and/or 
sectoral collective agreement floor. In addition to objective information 
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on pay rates, the TERS also surveys whether the business pays wages 
according to the national or sectoral collective agreements.  
As regards floors under working conditions, these are extensive as is to 
be expected given Greece’s “Mediterranean capitalism” (Psychogios and 
Wood, 2010) with its French civil law tradition. The floors are intended 
to be enforced mainly by the Labour Inspectorate and include (see e.g.  
Demekas and Kontolemis, 1997; Kufidu and Mihail, 1999) rules for 
compensation for individual and collective dismissals (EPL), for licensing 
overtime and shift-work, and for approving temporary and part-time 
contracts.
2
 In fact, temporary contracts (EIRO, 2001) are only permitted 
when there are “objective” reasons such as seasonal work, and 
temporary agency work is effectively marginal.
3
 Thus, we must bear in 
mind that the temporary worker escape route is not meant to be an easy 
option in Greece.  
The Labour Inspectorate is an important institution with a long history, 
being set up initially by the Venizelos government in 1910 (Avdela, 
1997). Admittedly, enforcement cannot be tight since there are few 
inspectors, only about 400 in 2008 (Labour Inspectorate, 2008), leading 
Mihail (2004, p.552) to even wonder if “enforcement is obsolete”. 
However, Labour Inspectors might retain considerable “negative” 
power, not least because of the stringent reporting requirements. 
                                                 
2
 Moreover, a detailed official annual return is required by the Labour Inspectorate, covering 
numbers employed, hours, wages and permanent-temporary contract status. In addition, 
any substantive change, including any new hires or workforce reductions, must be notified 
to the Public Employment Service within 8 days, these details then being passed to the 
Labour Inspectorate within 15 days. 
3
 The OECD’s (1999: pp.62, 66) survey of de jure temporary work protection gives Greece a 
high score of 4.8, on a 0-6 scale, while the UK for example is rated only at 0.3. The legal basis 
for temp work agencies was meant to be eased in 2001, but progress has been slow with 
negligible numbers in the TERS. 
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Obviously, it is a criminal offence for firms to mis-report their 
information. That these reporting duties are taken seriously is indicated 
by the Annual Reports of the Inspectorate. Thus, in 2008 (Labour 
Inspectorate, 2008), about 30,000 inspections were conducted, €10m of 
fines levied, and about 800,000 staff lists in respect of 2.4m staff were 
received. The 2.4m figure probably accounts for the large majority of 
relevant Greek employees – remembering the high number of single-
person firms, to which the provisions do not apply. The important point 
is that the fact that firms generally are not prosecuted does not 
necessarily mean that the threat itself of prosecution is empty. Whether 
the threat has real consequences in fact is testable. The TERS therefore 
contains questions probing whether managers contact Labour Inspectors 
for advice and instructions, and also for manager opinions on the effects 
of EPL on employment decisions which we can then test for actual 
effects. 
 
4. The Survey 
The TERS is based on a representative sample of 206 workplaces 
interviewed in 2006-7. Public sector workplaces are excluded, as is 
agriculture. The Survey includes very small workplaces, down to those 
employing only one worker. The sampling frame was the register of 
businesses maintained by the Thessaly Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. 293 workplaces were visited, and 206 full questionnaires 
achieved based on face-to-face interviews with the 
manager/owner/accountant. Since workplace size was not fully under 
our control in the sampling process due to lack of prior information on 
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the size of some workplaces, we then constructed weights. Our 
weighting objective was to replicate Thessaly’s population distribution of 
workplace sizes in the Employment Observatory Research-Informatics 
(PAEP 2003) survey. 
Details of the sample by workplace size are given in Table 1 (geographic 
information and industry composition is given in the Appendix). The 
distribution of workplaces according to the population is given in the 
first column, and the sample achieved in the second column.  As the first 
column shows, the large majority of private sector workplaces in 
Thessaly’s population of firms (and in Greece generally) are very small, 
97% being under 10 employees in size. Indeed, in the whole of Greece, 
only 0.4% of private workplaces employ more than 50 workers.
4
 Our 
oversampling of the larger workplaces is natural in this type of survey 
(for example, the WERS), and is necessary if an adequate picture is to be 
achieved of the larger workplaces, but is counteracted via our weights.  
Table 1 also shows employment of family workers. Family workers are 
important in Greece since the family firm is treated leniently by the 
Social Security authorities – as are small firms generally. One reason for 
this treatment is that there is a backlog of tax audits, so the government 
permits small firms to pay lower tax in order to speed the process 
(OECD, 2001). As can be seen, the employing of family members is 
                                                 
4
 With comparisons with other OECD countries see on OECD (2012), “Enterprises by size 
class”, in Entrepreneurship at a Glance 2012. See more on web page 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/entrepreneurship-at-a-glance-
2012/enterprises-by-size-class_entrepreneur_aag-2012-6-en. 
UK workplaces, for example, tend to be much larger (BIS, 2010): of the 1.2m enterprises with 
employees in 2009, about 3% employed more than 50. 
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common in all workplaces, only falling off in the very largest, 100+, 
category.  
TABLE 1: Distribution of the Survey Sample by Workplace Size and 
Family Interest 
 
How many employees are 
there in this workplace? 
Weighted 
base (%)* 
Sample (%) 
Employs family 
members 
No Yes 
1-5 179 (87) 73 (35) 36 64 
6-10 21 (10) 53 (25) 51 49 
11-19 2 (1) 34 (16) 56 44 
20-49 2 (1) 37 (18) 62 38 
50-99 0.2 (..) 3 (1) 33 67 
100+ 0.2 (..) 6 (3) 67 33 
Total 206 206 37 62 
Source: Sample figures are from the Thessaly Employment Relations Survey (TERS)  
* Weighted base is calculated from the distribution of Thessaly workplaces with personnel as 
given in the Employment Observatory Research - Informatics (PAEP, 2003) survey. 
Notes: Survey weights have been used to calculate the percentages of workplaces employing 
family members. The oversampling of larger workplaces in the TERS is seen as workplaces of 
size 50+ form about 5% of the sample but only 0.4% of the provincial population). 
 
 
Tables 2 and 3 focus on the wage floor system. Table 2 shows that 
national/sectoral wage agreements are important for Thessaly 
workplaces and manager-set or individual wage agreements are 
correspondingly less important. As can be seen from the top row, the 
managers in small workplaces claim that 59% of workers are covered by 
the national and sectoral wage agreements. “Individual” agreements, 
possibly circumventing the national/sectoral minimum (see below), 
account for most of the remainder. For larger workplaces, the 
national/sectoral agreements are more important (82%), indicating 
possibly closer adherence to the law, as might be expected. The last row 
gives an alternative workplace-based view which shows that collective 
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agreements are important, and cover the majority of workers in most 
workplaces. 
TABLE 2: Pay determination 
 
 Small, < 11 11 or more 
a) Determinants of pay 
in workplace (% of 
workers in the 
workplace)†: 
National or sectoral wage 
agreement 
59 82 
Enterprise agreement 14 5 
Individual agreement 26 12 
b) Percent of workplaces in which pay of majority is 
determined by national or sectoral agreements  
52 81 
Source & Notes: Survey weights have been used to calculate the percentages - see Table 1.  
† The workplace manager was asked the quesVon: “Looking at pay of employees in the 
largest occupational group, what proportion are paid according to…” the alternatives listed 
in the table, where we have added the national and sectoral agreement categories together 
because in interviews many employers could not distinguish the difference. 
 
TABLE 3: Wage Distribution of Employees  
 
Gross wage categories (in 2006 
Euros per year) 
Small, < 11 11 or more 
a) Distribution  of 
pay in workplace (% 
of workers in the 
workplace)†: 
11,000 (= gross minimum wage) 64% 36% 
11,001 – 13,500  25 42 
13,501 – 18,000 7 17 
18,001 – 23,000 0.5 1.5 
23,001 – 30,000 1.3 1.5 
More than 30,000 1.5 0.5 
b) Percent of workplaces in which pay of some workers is 
at or below 11,000  
65 31 
 
Source and Notes:  Survey weights have been used to calculate the percentages - see Table 
1.  
† The workplace manager was asked to “Fill in this card for the percentage of your 
employees who belong to the following categories…” as shown in the table. Note the gross 
minimum includes 16% for employee social security contributions. 
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Nevertheless, while most managers claim that worker pay is determined 
by the national collective agreements, pay levels in many cases appear 
to be too low. As can be seen, from Table 3, the Survey reveals that 64% 
of workers in small workplaces are paid the national minimum (or more 
likely less), and a smaller though still substantial proportion, 36%, are 
paid the minimum in larger workplaces.
5
 In fact, the pay distribution is 
highly skewed near (or below) the legal minimum of €11,000, with 89% 
of workers in small firms earning less than €13,500. Thus, the minimum 
wage in Greece seems to be very high relative to the going average wage 
– in fact, it seems that the system only finds it possible to operate with 
such a minimum thanks to the fact that the minimum is often not 
observed, at least in provincial labour markets such as Thessaly. Here we 
see concretely (Mihail 2004, p 550) “the ability of Greek SMEs not to 
comply with labour law regulations”. Still, to repeat, lack of compliance 
does not necessarily mean that the law has no effect, since less 
prosperous employers can avoid the law by taking on a temp or family 
worker, given that these workers are less likely to complain.  
Turning next to what the Survey shows about working conditions floors, 
Table 4 introduces evidence of the legal pressures to which managers 
are subject. We see that a high percentage of managers seek 
professional advice on employee relations, particularly from external 
lawyers and accountants. Only 21% of small workplaces have not sought 
advice over the past 2 years, compared to 49% of their WERS 
counterparts (over the past year, admittedly shorter). Still, we see that 
                                                 
5
 These figures are higher than official estimates (Koutsogeorgopolou, 1994, p.88) of 15-20%, 
in part because we use a gross minimum adding on 16% to cover employee social security 
contributions, rather than a net minimum. 
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small enterprises are less likely to approach the labour inspector. Only 
20% do, perhaps aiming to limit any “collaboration” with the 
Inspectorate which is the most feared body since it can apply a variety of 
penalties.  
 TABLE 4: Advice on Employee Relations -TERS contrasted with WERS 
(Percent of Workplaces)  
 
Sources of Advice on Employee 
Relations 
TERS - advice over past 
24 months 
WERS 2004-advice 
over past 12 months 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
Small, 
< 11 
11 or 
more 
Accountant 62 69 18 6 
Lawyer 27 52 17 34 
Management Consultants 4 17 9 17 
Labour Inspectorate 20 58 NA NA 
Public Employment Services  37 49 NA NA 
Social Insurance Institute 24 44 NA NA 
 Chamber of Commerce & Industry 21 19 NA NA 
DTI or govt dept NA NA 28 59 
Employers’ Association 5 12 3 4 
Advisory and Conciliation Service NA NA 18 46 
No advice 21 15 49 25 
Sample numbers 126 80 278 1985 
Sources: TERS 2006 and WERS 2004. 
Notes: Survey weights are used to calculate all percentages.  Columns sum to over 
100%, since more than one source of advice may be used. 
 
Turning to direct Survey questions on the Labour Inspectorate, Table 5 
suggests that the Inspectorate is far from “obsolete”. As can be seen 
from panel a), a high percentage of workplaces, particularly those 
employing 11 or more consult the Labour Inspectorate when making 
workforce reductions or dismissal – and when employing temps. Also, 
manager opinions (panel b) suggest that Inspectors have power. Thus, 
  14 
many (45 to 52%) see the hiring and firing laws monitored by the 
Inspectorate as negative for recruitment, and only a minority (33 to 39%) 
find it easy to gain permission to employ temps. In addition, a small 
proportion of managers, 10%, believe that temporary contracts are to be 
preferred because temps are easier to fire. While this proportion is 
small, we will see below that the belief is important empirically. As might 
be expected, family workplaces (not shown) tend to be less affected by 
the Labour Inspectorate, though 50% even of these workplaces see the 
hiring and firing laws as problematic. We now turn to multivariate 
analysis based on these questions.  
TABLE 5: The Labour Inspector (Percent of Workplaces) 
 Small, < 11 11 or more 
a) Workplace consulted with Labour Inspector  
before workforce reduction (% of workplaces  with 
reductions) 
24 52 
Labour Inspector gives advice on dismissals (% of 
workplaces  asking advice from inspector) 
31 70 
Labour Inspector gives advice on temps (% of 
workplaces asking advice from inspector) 
29 38 
b) Hiring/firing laws are an obstacle to recruitment  
(% strongly agreeing or agreeing) 
52 45 
Labour Inspector easily gives permission to  
employ temps (% strongly agreeing or agreeing) 
33 39 
Temp workers are to be preferred because they 
are easier to fire (% strongly agreeing or agreeing) 
10 10 
Sample numbers 126 80 
Sources: TERS 2006 - Notes: Survey weights are used to calculate all percentages.  
Notes: a) Rows are answers to questions with a simple yes/no answer.  
b) Rows are derived from questions of the form “I would like to find your views on aspects of 
labour regulation…”, scored on a likert scale ranging, 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, …, 
5=strongly disagree 
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5. Methods 
BASIC MEASURES 
For temporary work in the i-th workplace, tempi, our measure is the 
percentage of the workplace’s workforce covered by fixed-term and 
seasonal work contracts, plus trainees and subsidised workers (as noted, 
temporary agency workers are negligible). It is thus a broad definition. 
For family work in the i-th workplace, familyi, our measure is similarly 
the percentage of family workers employed. A problem is that many 
firms employ no temps or family workers. To circumvent this censoring 
problem, the estimation is carried out by means of a Tobit procedure 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2009 review; see Batt 2002 for an application). 
The tobit model can be summarised as follows: 
temp
*
i = β’legali + γ’controlsi + εi , and 
 tempi  = temp
*
i  if temp
*
i > 0, or tempi = 0  if temp
*
i <= 0, 
where tempi  is observed, while  temp*i is “latent”, and  εi  is an iid N(0, 
σ
2
) error term. legali is the vector of legal variables to be described, with 
a vector of controlsi. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood 
which is inconsistent if the normality assumption for the error is not in 
fact correct, and we use a test proposed by Vincent (2010) to check the 
assumption. A similar equation is estimated with familyi.as the 
dependent variable. Means and correlations of the main variables are 
given in Table 6 which we now discuss. 
Our legal variables under the heading of wage floors are, first, a dummy 
for whether the firm pays a majority below the gross minimum wage of 
€11,000 as set by the national wage agreement. The survey question 
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underlying this variable has already been discussed in connection with 
Table 3. It is shown in row 4 in Table 6. This variable indicates generally 
low wages which characterise a “poor” firm. We therefore expect it to 
be positively linked to temp and family worker employment since such 
marginal firms are always likely to be at risk of changes in circumstance 
such as declines in product demand, or increases in legal requirements.  
An alternative, second, variable is a dummy for whether a business 
claims to observe the national or sectoral wage agreement, as already 
discussed in Table 2. Our measure is a dummy based on whether a 
majority of workers are paid according to the national agreement. This is 
in row 5 of Table 6, and can be seen to work in the opposite direction to 
the minimum wage variable (the correlation between the two is 
negative, -0.048). An explanation for this converse movement is that 
only the more prosperous firms are able to observe the collective 
agreement. As can be seen from the simple correlations, this variable 
links well with making hires (0.288) and size (0.128), both of which 
should mark prosperity.  
We also combine these wage variables into a third “grey” variable which 
flags up workplaces which both pay some workers at or below the 
minimum and do not observe the national wage agreement for most 
workers. These businesses are in a grey legal position, since the only 
lawful way to avoid the national agreement is by paying more, yet they 
are paying some of their workers less. This variable is given in row 3 
which shows that 29% of workplaces fall into this most marginal 
category. As can be seen, this grey category correlates well with 
employing temps (0.188), even better with employing family workers 
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(who are more or less outside the law, 0.295), and is composed of 
declining businesses as shown by the negative correlation with hires in 
the past 2 years (-0.211). These firms also tend to be small as expected (-
0.078 correlation with employment).  
We have three legal variables under the heading of working conditions 
floors. First, we construct a variable for whether the management has 
taken employment relations advice from either an accountant or a 
lawyer, as discussed already in connection with Table 4. This variable is 
given in row 6. We predict a positive link with temporary employment 
here, on the argument that taking legal advice is a necessary 
prerequisite for clearing the way for drawing up and/or renewing temp 
contracts. This influence should presumably be less strong for 
employment of family workers which come outside the power of the 
Labour Inspectorate. 
A second legal variable relates to whether the manager finds the Labour 
Inspectorate easily gives permission to employ temps, an aspect 
discussed already in Table 5. This variable is shown in row 7, and should 
enter positively in the equation for temps. A third variable is simply 
whether the manager considers temps to be preferred because they are 
easier to fire (see Table 5). This variable should directly pick up whether 
temps are being hired to provide the flexibility which EPL denies – see 
row 8. We include all these variables in the family worker equation as 
well, even though the Labour Inspectorate has no direct interest in 
whether a business uses family workers. Our reasoning here is that a 
business which feels constrained by the Labour Inspectorate might 
nevertheless feel it is safer to employ family workers.
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TABLE 6: Means and Correlations of the Main Variables 
Variables Means 
Correlations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1) Percent of workers temporary 
including  fixed term contract and 
agency workers in workforce 
12% 1.000   
       
2) Percent of family employees in 
workforce 
33% -0.118
*
 1.000  
       
3) “grey” category – some workers 
paid at or  below the minimum, and 
majority  uncovered by national or 
sectoral agreement, 1=yes 
0.29 0.180
***
 0.295
***
 1.000 
       
4) majority paid at or below the 
minimum wage (11,000€), 1=yes 
0.64 0.135
*
 0.154
**
 0.362
***
 1.000 
      
5) majority covered by national or 
sectoral wage agreement, 1=yes 
0.53 -0.108 -0.388
***
 -0.790
***
 -0.048 1.000  
    
6) firm taking ER advice from both 
accountant and  lawyer  in last 2 yrs, 
1=yes 
0.25 0.079 -0.105 -0.220
***
 -0.200
***
 0.129
*
 1.000 
    
7) dummy for managers feeling LI no 
obstacle for temps, 1=strongly 
agree/agree 
0.33 -0.014 0.012 -0.102 -0.136
*
 0.072 0.074 1.000 
   
8) dummy for manager feeling temps 
are preferred because easy to fire, 
1=strongly agree/agree 
0.10 0.168
**
 0.083 0.114 0.097 -0.040 -0.041 -0.105 1.000 
  
9) any hires in last 2 yrs, 1=yes 0.45 0.116
*
 -0.284
***
 -0.211
***
 -0.197
***
 0.288
***
 0.162
**
 -0.022 -0.211
***
 1.000  
10) managers considers workers 
quite or very committed, 1=yes 
0.72 -0.228
***
 -0.132
*
 0.167
** 
-0.101 -0.112 -0.161
**
 0.005 -0.201
***
 -0.120
*
 1.000 
11) number of employees 4.5 0.017 -0.117
*
 -0.078 -0.097 0.123
*
 0.052 0.037 0.006 0.156
**
 -0.019 
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CONTROLS 
The controls are important since the regulatory escape hypothesis can 
only hold when the other factors determining temp employment are 
allowed for. In setting up our controls, we follow mainly Voudouris 
(2004), who builds on the classic Abraham and Taylor (1996) 
specification. In the first place, we require controls for variability of 
demand which obviously increases the use of temps. This aspect relates 
to the “buffering” role of temps (and perhaps family workers). For 
example, retailing and hotels/restaurants face large changes both 
annually and weekly which require a buffer. Hence we include a set of 
broad industry dummies. Hires and redundancies over the period (row 9 
only shows hires but we also include redundancies) might also indicate 
demand variability – or alternatively, firm prosperity (see below). Similar 
controls (not shown in Table 6) are dummies for whether the firm has 
increased part-time or non-routine sub-contract work over the past 5 
years.  
We also look for controls for the specific training requirements of jobs 
performed in the workplace. The payoff to specific training of temps 
(and perhaps family workers) is low, so a business with high training 
requirements should require fewer such workers. Training requirements 
can be picked up by variables for the use of part-timers, and young and 
old workers (included, but not shown in Table 6), all of whom are likely 
to have less training and so indicate a business for whom temps may be 
more suitable. On the other hand, these groups, particularly part-timers, 
are to some extent substitutes for temps and family workers, which 
could give rise to a negative link with temps – this is an empirically open 
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issue. Low paid workers are also likely to have less training, which gives 
an additional reason for the majority low-paid dummy linking positively 
with temps. 
Furthermore, controls for difficulties in monitoring the job, for “know-
how”, and for complex interactions with other people doing the work 
might be needed, since these too (Voudouris 2004) suggest processes 
for which temps might be unsuitable. To some extent these 
considerations conflict with the training variable for old workers – while 
older workers are not likely to be trained, many obviously have know-
how. Hence the old worker variable could indicate task/monitoring 
complexity and be negatively associated with the demand for temps. 
However, low-paid workers should also have less complex and easy-to-
monitor tasks, reinforcing the positive link between this variable and 
temp demand.  
A further variable is the manager’s assessment of workers’ commitment 
at the workplace (see row 10) which could link to the demand for temps 
in two ways. First, a committed workforce is likely to signify a business 
with more complex tasks (needing worker commitment) which will be 
less suited to temp workers. Indeed, a strong negative correlation (-
0.228) can be seen between this variable and the percent of temps. 
Second, superior managers may themselves be able to engender 
commitment. Superior management will in turn mean greater firm 
prosperity which then links to less temp employment via our basic 
hypothesis that prosperous firms have less need to use temp or family 
workers as escape routes. 
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Finally, we control for firm size (row 11) on the argument that larger 
firms may face a greater variety of problems, and thus may need more 
solutions, of which temporary workers could be one. For family workers, 
large firms must necessarily employ a smaller proportion, since families 
are of a limited size. Hence we would expect large firms automatically to 
employ a smaller family worker proportion. 
 
6. Results 
We now present the regression results, starting with temporary work in 
Table 7, then moving on to family work in Table 8. As regards weights, 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010, p.113) advise that so long as the model has 
sufficient controls, and in particular includes determinants of the 
sampling frame, the most efficient estimator does not use weights. The 
TERS over-samples larger workplaces, as discussed, and all the 
regressions control for workplace size, so it is reasonable to use 
unweighted regression whose residuals pass the normality test. 
However, for completeness, we also report weighted results which do 
not pass the normality test, though we use robust standard errors 
(Baum, 2006, p.266) which are conservative to help overcome this 
problem. 
Results for Temporary Workers 
As noted, the temporary worker dependent variable is broadly defined 
to include seasonal workers. However, even this broad definition still 
leaves about two-thirds of firms at zero (see notes to Table 7), 
employing no temp workers of any sort, hence our Tobit model. To 
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estimate effect sizes of coefficients here we need to multiply the tobit 
coefficients by the proportion of positive observations. 
Going down the rows of Table 7, we start with the important wage floor 
variables. As discussed above, the variable for whether a majority of the 
workplace’s workers is paid at or below €11,000 can be taken to indicate 
a low-wage, “poor” (low-productivity) firm. The weighted first column 
results show that if this variable changes from 1 to 0 (in other words 
comparing a low paying to a high paying business) the proportion of 
temps increases by 8 (=0.32×27) percentage points. The effect is 
somewhat smaller, about 6 points ((=0.32×19) if we take the unweighted 
result. This result fits with the argument that if a firm feels pressured by 
the minimum wage agreements, it employs on a temporary basis
6
, given 
the controls. 
At the same time, the collective bargaining coverage variable in the next 
row shows that if the majority of workers are paid according to the 
national wage collective agreements the temp proportion decreases. In 
fact, if this variable changes from 1 to 0 (in other words comparing a 
business which pays a majority of its workers according to an agreement 
with one which does not) the proportion of temporary workers 
decreases by 8 (=.32×25) percentage points (7 points using the 
unweighted results). As noted above, a possible explanation for this 
result is that high collective bargaining coverage indicates a law-abiding 
and rich firm, which is not driven to employ temps.  
 
                                                 
6
 Regressions explaining the proportion low paid in a workplace show that the proportion is 
associated with decline (i.e. not hiring), and also with small size. For collective bargaining 
coverage, we find the opposite, indicating stronger firms. 
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TABLE 7: Regressions for Temporary Worker Employment 
Dependent variable:  
Percent of temporary workers 
including seasonal workers 
 
Independent variable 
Weighted 
Coefficient 
Weighted 
Coefficient 
Unweighted 
Coefficient 
Unweighted 
Coefficient 
Majority paid at or below  
11,000€ per year 
0.27
**
  0.19
**
 .. 
Majority covered by national & 
sectoral wage agreement  
-0.25
**
  -0.21
**
 .. 
“Grey” category – some workers paid 
<=11,000€, and majority not covered 
by collective agreement 
 0.37
***
  0.34
***
 
firm taking ER advice from  acct. or 
lawyer  in last 2 yrs  
-0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.06 
dummy for managers feeling labour 
inspector  no obstacle for temps  
0.22
*
 0.19
*
 0.05 0.03 
dummy for manager feeling temps 
preferred because easy to fire 
0.33
*
 0.26 0.27
**
 0.26
**
 
Managers considers  workers 
committed  
-0.19 -0.24
*
 0.01 0.03 
any family employees 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.03 
any part-time workers -0.39
***
 -0.35
**
 -0.20
*
 -0.22
**
 
percent old workers, >51  -0.26 -0.34 -0.25 -0.38 
percent young workers, <21  0.37 0.38 0.28 0.35 
any increase in subcontract  or part-
time workers  over past 5 yrs  
0.13 0.14 0.02 0.05 
Any planned increase in subcontract or 
part-time workers over next 2 yrs 
0.01 -0.00 0.15
*
 0.14 
any non-routine subcontracting -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 
any redundancies in last 2 yrs -0.08 -0.10 -0.19
*
 -0.19 
any hires in last 2 yrs 0.23
**
 0.20 0.32
***
 0.32
***
 
number workers  employed x 10 -0.02 -0.01 0.02
***
 0.02
***
 
Industry dummies (9)  YES YES YES YES 
pseudo R
2
 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.29 
Test for normal and 
homoskedastic error 
test value: 32.4† 30.2† 5.2 4.3 
5% critical 
value: 
8.2 6.4 6.1 5.6 
Notes:  ***, **, * signify 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, using robust standard errors. 
Equations have 187 observations, 125 left censored at 0. Tobit coefficients have to be 
multiplied by the proportion of non-zero observations (0.32=62/187) to give effects 
conditional on being observed. 
† Both these tests (Vincent 2010) fail, however they are ﬁ`ed to the model without industry 
dummies since the test would not converge with the full model with weights. Hence robust 
standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi 2010, 540) are used to calculate significance values. 
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As a test of this interpretation, we use the “grey” workplace category 
variable detailed in Table 6 above. As noted, this variable indicates the 
workplaces which are (probably illegally) paying some of their workers 
below the legal minimum, and which are not covered by the collective 
agreements. These workplaces are therefore the least prosperous, and 
we expect them to feel most pressure from wage floors. Results are 
given in the third row which gives a highly significant effect. A firm in the 
“grey” category has 11 (=.32×.37) percentage points (10 points using the 
unweighted result) higher temp employment. 
Next consider our three variables relating to working conditions floors. 
The first variable indicates legal difficulties with employment relations, 
via the taking of employee relations advice. We expect a negative 
coefficient here, but it is never significant as can be seen. However, the 
second variable for whether the firm does not have difficulties with the 
Labour Inspectorate over hiring temps, is significantly positive at least in 
the weighted columns. In other words, firms which feel that the Labour 
Inspector is no obstacle to employing temps appear to use temps more 
widely, and vice versa. The suggestion is, therefore, that the Labour 
Inspector can indeed form an obstacle to temp employment.  
The last working conditions variable is based on the simple direct 
question as to whether the firm prefers temps because they are easier 
to fire. This variable produces the strongest results. As can be seen, its 
coefficient is positive and significant in three of the specifications. This 
result suggests that a factor promoting the employment of temps is 
indeed the simple fact that they are easy to fire.  
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We now turn to the controls. First, there is the variable for whether 
managers consider their workers committed. As we have noted, this 
variable could signify more complex tasks and/or a better managed, 
more prosperous firm which should point to less temp employment. 
Here, the results are mixed, with the unweighted regressions showing no 
reaction, though the weighted regressions are strongly negative, as 
expected. Interestingly, the simple correlation in Table 6 is also 
significantly negative (-0.228) which leads us to feel that there is some 
support for the argument.  
Next there are the variables linked to labour flexibility in the workplace. 
These are (a) the part-time variable, (b) the family employment variable 
and (c) the variable for possible future flexibility in the workplace. The 
part-time variable indicates whether the firm employs any part-timers. 
We see that it is strongly negatively related to the percentage of 
temporary workers, suggesting that part-timers and temps are 
substitutes, which is plausible. In other words, a business which has 
managed to secure some part-time workers might not wish or need to 
go to the trouble of securing permission for temp worker contracts as 
well. 
The family variable is based on whether the firm employs any family 
members. We might expect family members to provide an alternative 
source of flexibility- rather as part-timers do. In fact, the family variable 
is insignificant. Nevertheless, in other regressions (not shown here) 
explaining coverage by collective agreements, family members are 
significantly linked negatively with coverage by the collective 
agreements (see also the negative simple correlation -0.388 in Table 6) 
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which, as we have already seen, impacts on temps. In other words, we 
may have already picked up the family worker effect via the collective 
bargaining coverage (or grey market) variables.  
The last variable, workplace flexibility, indicates “the firm’s expectations 
for the future about increases in part-time, temp and subcontracting 
employment”. We see that expected future use of flexible forms of 
employment is only significantly linked with temporary work in the 
unweighted regression (the third column). In other words, there are 
signs, that current temporary employment indicates future temporary 
employment.  
We also include variables for the workforce age composition. As noted, 
older workers might be associated with skilled work, which is more 
difficult for temps to do, and younger workers are the converse (young 
workers are also a typical outsider group, likely to be more associated 
with temps). In fact, as can be seen, higher percentages of older workers 
are indeed negatively linked with temp work and conversely for younger 
workers. While these coefficients do not quite gain significance given our 
conservative testing standards, there is some confirmation of this 
reasoning. 
In addition, we include variables for whether the firm has hired workers, 
or made redundancies. These both strongly indicate that expanding 
firms (fewer redundancies and more hires) are more likely to hire temps. 
It therefore seems that the future3 may see a further expansion in 
temporary contracts.  
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Finally there is the control for workplace size (number of employees). 
Here, the unweighted regressions in the third and fourth columns 
indicate that larger firms employ more temps perhaps because they face 
more variable tasks. However, the weighted regressions in the first two 
columns overturn this result, and show signs of a negative link. It might 
be that the weighted results which emphasise the small firm group are 
showing how larger size (within this group) means less need of the temp 
worker escape route. Be this as it may, the firm size effect is small either 
way given our other controls.  
Analysis of Family Employment  
We now use the tobit model to explain the percentage of family workers 
employed in the workplace. On the right hand side, we use most of the 
same variables used in the temp worker regression. Starting as before 
with the wage floor variables, we see that while family employment is 
not significantly linked to the majority on low pay variable, it is strongly 
negatively linked to coverage by collective agreements. This finding is in 
line with the temp worker finding that prosperous firms (which follow 
national agreements) are less likely to employ temps. In other words, 
family workers are also a form of flexible employment and richer firms 
which are less at the mercy of changes in the market may consequently 
be less in need of family and temporary workers.  
Backing up this argument, the “grey” category variable is strongly 
positive. Hence, we see that workplaces in the grey category, paying low 
wages probably below nationally agreed rates, are more likely to employ 
a high percentage of family workers, other things equal. As was the case 
for temp workers, we conclude that poorer firms are more likely to 
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favour family workers because they are easy to lay off and less likely to 
complain about low wages. 
Turning next to variables which relate to employment regulation and 
labour inspectorate issues, the strongest results are for the variable for 
feeling temps have low EPL (0.25 in the first column). While this variable 
relates to temps, not to family workers, our interpretation is that it 
indicates that firms employing family workers are conscious of EPL. Such 
consciousness could thus be a factor in their sticking to family workers 
for whom EPL also does not apply.  
Regarding variables which deal with hiring and redundancy, we see that 
the hiring variable tends to be negative and redundancies positive. This 
result indicates that firms that employ family workers are less likely to 
grow. Additionally, it is worth noting the large negative coefficient (-0.75 
in the first column) on the percentage of young workers, which goes 
along with the conservative, non-growing nature of Greek family firms. 
As regards variables with a flexibility character, part-time employment 
and temporary employment, we see that both these variable have 
negative signs indicating substitutability, though significance depends 
somewhat on specification. We expect substitutability since temps, 
family workers and part-time workers are alternative pathways to 
flexibility. Finally, the firm size variable is significant and negative in all 
specifications, simply indicating that firms run out of family members to 
employ as they grow – which is natural. 
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TABLE 8: Regressions for Family Worker Employment 
Dependent variable: 
Percent of family workers 
 
Independent variable 
Weighted 
Coefficient 
Weighted 
Coefficient 
Unweighted 
Coefficient 
Unweighted 
Coefficient 
Majority paid at or below  
11,000€ per year 
.07 .. .00 .. 
Majority covered by national & 
sectoral wage agreement  
-0.14 .. -0.21
***
 .. 
“Grey” category – some workers 
paid <=11,000€, and majority not 
covered by collective agreement 
.. 0.15
***
 .. 0.24
***
 
firm taking ER advice from  acct. or 
lawyer  in last 2 yrs  
0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 
dummy for managers feeling labour 
inspector  no obstacle for temps  
0.13 0.12 0.06 0.04 
dummy for manager feeling temps 
preferred because easy to fire 
0.25
*
 0.24* 0.16
*
 0.14 
Managers considers  workers 
committed  
0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 
any non-routine subcontracting 0.11 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 
any redundancies in last 2 yrs 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.07 
any hires in last 2 yrs -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 
percent temp employees -0.38 -0.31 -0.22 -0.26
* 
any part-time workers -0.13 -0.12
*
 -0.08 -0.09 
any seasonal workers 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.14 
percent old workers, >51  -0.29 0.28 -0.03 -0.07 
percent young workers, <21  -0.75
**
 -0.70
8 
-0.76
**
 -0.62
**
 
any increase in subcontract  or part-
time workers  over past 5 yrs  
0.13 0.12 0.05 0.05 
Any planned increase in subcontract 
or part-time workers over next 2 yrs 
-0.19
**
 -0.18
* 
-0.07 -0.08 
number workers  employed x 10 -0.22
***
 -0.23
**
 -0.04
***
 -.04
***
 
Industry dummies (5)  YES YES YES YES 
pseudo R
2
 0.26 0.25 0.30 0.29 
Test for normal and 
homoskedastic error 
test value: 46.0 41.8† 6.8 6.7 
5% critical 
value: 
4.4† 5.8 6.5 5.8 
Notes:  ***, **, * signify 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, using robust standard errors. 
Equations have 187 observations, 92 left censored at 0. Tobit coefficients have to be 
multiplied by the proportion of non-zero observations (0.51=95/187) to give effects 
conditional on being observed.  
† The tests for normality fail for the weighted regressions, however they are ﬁ`ed to the 
model without industry dummies since the test would not converge for the full model with 
weights.  Hence robust standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi 2010, 540) are used to 
calculate significance values. 
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7. Conclusions  
We have seen that the Greek labour market was performing badly even 
in the pre-crisis period. Greece has typical Mediterranean high wage and 
working conditions floors, though admittedly with apparent widespread 
avoidance. However, even floors which are avoided may provoke fear 
and so can have a chilling effect on management decisions and 
encourage precarious temporary worker employment. The purpose of 
this paper is to go to the micro level, using a mini-WERS constructed for 
Greek conditions (the TERS), to show with greater precision how legal 
constraints might affect firm decisions. In a sense we are using Greece as 
a case study to test the “escape route” hypothesis, and fortunately at 
the time our survey was conducted, there was no question of 
recessionary conditions affecting the results. Our focus has been on 
temporary employment which can be used as an indicator of the way in 
which firms react to legal constraints. Family work is also of interest as 
an escape route. The basic hypothesis is that temporary and family work, 
are forms of insurance for the poorer firms which cannot cope with high 
wage and working conditions floors.  
As regards the determinants of the demand for temps, we have two 
important results. First, given our many controls, there is the significant 
positive sign of the minimum wage variable – or the “grey” category 
variable. This sign fits our hypothesis in that where firms have a high 
proportion of workers on the minimum they are likely to worry about 
the possibility of a rise in the minimum, and hence will employ on a 
more temporary basis, other things being equal. Our second important 
result is the importance of labour regulation variables. We see that temp 
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hiring decisions respond to manager judgements about the Labour 
Inspector’s position about employing temps, and to judgements about 
whether temps are easy to fire. We take these results to signal both that 
employing temps is not easy (hence the need for knowledge about the 
Labour Inspector) and that their advantage is their low levels of EPL. Our 
results therefore suggest that labour law, though avoided by many firms, 
does have a perceptible chilling effect; it matters. 
Findings for family worker employment are similar to temp worker 
employment in that the “grey” category variable is strongly positive, 
given our controls. Workplaces in the grey category, paying low wages 
probably below nationally agreed rates, are more likely to employ a high 
percentage of family workers, other things equal. As was the case for 
temp workers, we conclude that marginal firms favour family workers 
because they are easy to layoff, and less likely to complain about low 
wages. At the same time, we also find some effects for EPL variables. In 
particular, we find a strong coefficient on the dummy for feeling temp 
contracts are advantageous because of temps’ easier dismissal, 
indicating that firms that employ family workers are conscious of EPL. In 
general, we find substitutability between temps, family workers and 
part-time workers, which is reasonable, since these groups represent 
alternative pathways to flexibility.  
In sum, therefore, our results support the hypothesis stated at the 
outset, namely, that marginal firms, which cannot afford the national 
wage rates or the EPL standards, attempt to escape these standards, by 
employing temps and/or family workers. For these workers, a temporary 
job is not a stepping stone to something better, but a long-term 
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condition required if their employers are to survive. Our findings thus 
provide support for Voudouris’s (2004, p 132) view that extensive use of 
temporary contracts is a means of circumventing a strict EPL regime 
coupled with high (though porous) minimum wage floors. Again, our 
findings which come from a firm-level database support Kahn’s (2007) 
result that EPL raises temp work based on a quite different database – 
aggregate cross-country data. That two such different approaches reach 
a similar result builds confidence.  
It is worth concluding with some caveats, since these findings are based 
only on a first attempt at a large-scale firm survey in Greece. Our survey 
only covers one provincial area, namely Thessaly, and the evidence base 
should be broadened to cover more of Greece, including the important 
Athens area. The TERS results indeed imply that Greece’s system of 
labour regulation encourages precarious temporary and family work, 
and needs revision. Such revision in fact appears to be in train in the 
current crisis conditions. Still, the TERS needs to be substantiated by 
broader surveys, and furthermore, the possible form for the required 
legal revisions in collective bargaining and EPL needs further research. 
This said, our initial results support the case for these revisions.  
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Notes 
(1) Moreover, a detailed official annual return is required by the 
Labour Inspectorate, covering numbers employed, hours, wages 
and permanent-temporary contract status. In addition, any 
substantive change, including any new hires or workforce 
reductions, must be notified to the Public Employment Service 
within 8 days, these details then being passed to the Labour 
Inspectorate within 15 days. 
(2) The OECD’s (1999: pp 62, 66) survey of de jure temporary work 
protection gives Greece a high score of 4.8, on a 0-6 scale, while the 
UK for example is rated only at 0.3. The legal basis for temp work 
agencies was meant to be eased in 2001, but progress has been 
slow with negligible numbers in the TERS. 
(3) In the OECD’s (1999: pp 55 and 66) survey of de jure strictness of 
employment protection for regular employment, Greece scores 2 
on a 0-3 scale for “regular procedural inconveniences”, similar to 
other Mediterranean states such as Italy, for example (1.5), but 
higher than the UK (1.0). Greece’s overall score for protection of 
regular employment is 2.4, similar to Italy’s 2.8, and of course 
higher than the UK’s 0.8. A de facto comparison, based on 
executive opinions, is given in the World Economic Forum (WEF 
2010) report and still shows Greece as relatively strict. 
(4) UK workplaces, for example, tend to be much larger (BIS, 2010): of 
the 1.2m enterprises with employees in 2009, about 3% employed 
more than 50.  
(5) These figures are higher than official estimates (Koutsogeorgopolou 
1994, p88) of 15-20%, in part because we use a gross minimum 
adding on16% to cover employee social security contributions, 
rather than a net minimum. 
(6) Regressions explaining the proportion low paid in a workplace show 
that the proportion is associated with decline (i.e. not hiring), and 
also with small size. For collective bargaining coverage, we find the 
opposite, indicating stronger firms. 
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Appendix A. 
Comparison of Industry Composition, TERS and WERS 2004  
(Percent of Workplaces) 
 
Industry Category 
TERS 
WERS, private 
sector 
workplaces < 20 
Weighted 
percentages 
Weighted 
percentages 
Manufacturing  9 % 11% 
Electricity, gas and water  0 0 
Construction  6 5 
Wholesale and retail  50 30 
Hotels and restaurants  20 10 
Transport and communication  2 4 
Financial and other business services  3 24 
Education and health 1 10 
Other community and personal services  10 6 
Total 100 (Sample 
number=206) 
100 (Sample 
number=483) 
Sources:  WERS 2004 and TERS. 
Notes: 
*
Survey weights have been used to calculate all percentages.  
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Appendix B. 
Geographic Information 
 
 
 
 
As shown above, Thessaly is a region in North-central Greece. In 2006-7 
it had a population of approx. 0.75 million out of Greece’s 11m. Its 
employment was about 300,000 out of Greece’s then 4.5m. This region 
is Greece's flattest, with the country's largest single plain, but it also 
contains Greece’s highest mountain, Mount Olympus (2 917 m).   
Thessaly's economic development is centred around the cities of Larissa 
and the port of Volos, each of which has its own pattern of activity. 
There is a high level of manufacturing activity in Volos, which has 
traditionally been a centre of general and mechanical engineering.  
Larissa on the other hand is mainly an educational and retail centre, with 
peripheral industrial activities linked mainly to agricultural processing. 
Outside of these cities, in the western part of the region (Trikala, 
Karditsa), economic activity is centred on agriculture, but there is also 
considerable tourism focused on the area’s many hilltop monasteries.  
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